The Motivations and Consequences of the Belligerence of Safavid Shaykhs and Kings from the Era of Junayd to the Treaty of Peace at Zuhab (851-1049 AH)

The Safavid Order (tariqat), from the era of Shaykh Safi al-Din Ardabili (d. 730 AH) until the beginning of the period of Shaykh Junayd (r. ca. 831–864 AH), was founded upon the spiritual relationship between the shaykhs and their disciples. From the era of Shaykh Junayd onward, militancy and ghazi warfare supplanted Sufi asceticism, and the Safavid shaykhs, by placing the sword in the hands of their disciples and the Qizilbash, transformed the Safavid Order into a political party and brought it into the power equations of Iran. The present study seeks to elucidate the manifest and latent functions of Safavid militancy and belligerence, and endeavors to answer the question: on the basis of what motivations did the Safavid shaykhs and kings turn to belligerence and ghazi warfare?
The data of this research have been gathered through consultation of primary sources from the Safavid era and examined by means of historical analysis method.
The first Safavid battles with their rivals began in the era of Shaykh Junayd (d. 864 AH). Shah Isma'il Safavi (r. 907–930 AH) in numerous wars defeated Farrukh-Yasar Shirvanshah (906 AH), Alvand Beg Aq-Qoyunlu (907 AH), and subsequently Sultan Murad Aq-Qoyunlu at Hamadan. Shah Isma'il, armed with armor, sword, and lance, would present himself on the battlefield with forces considerably fewer than those of his rivals. This manner earned him sanctity, divine charisma (farr-i izadi), and inviolability among the Sufis and Qizilbash, transforming him into a god-like figure. Victory over the Uzbeks, as a powerful rival, confirmed and reinforced his legitimacy and prepared the ground for domestic and foreign political maneuvers.
After overcoming the Uzbeks, he dispatched conquest letters (fath-namahs) to India, Syria, and Rum (Byzantine). In addition, he also sent conquest letters to domestic regions of Iran where the possibility of rebellion and unrest existed. Among these regions, mention may be made of Iraq, Fars, Azerbaijan, Kerman, Khuzistan, Baghdad, Diyarbakr, Shirvan, and Tabaristan. Nevertheless, the defeat at Chaldiran brought far-reaching consequences in its wake. Religious and political beliefs concerning the Shah were damaged, and his metaphysical image collapsed in the eyes of his followers. Furthermore, he withdrew from military and state affairs and spent most of his time in hunting, polo, amusement, and wine-drinking.
The defeat at Chaldiran prepared the ground for the rise to power of the Qizilbash chiefs and the increase of their insubordination. Shah Tahmasp, in order to put an end to the disputes among the amirs and to curb their insubordination, first and foremost proved his capabilities in the Battle of Jam against the Uzbeks in 935 AH. Then, in 937 AH, he issued the order for the execution of Chuha Sultan and other Tekelu amirs, and in the years 939–940 AH, by issuing the order for the execution of Husayn Khan Shamlu, he put an end to Qizilbash domination. Since the defeat at the Battle of Chaldiran had inflicted great damage upon royal prestige, Shah Tahmasp, in order to remain immune from the consequences of a possible defeat, avoided direct confrontation with the Ottomans. Nevertheless, between the years 947 and 960 AH, he marched four times to the Caucasus in order to present himself as a conquering monarch and to reinforce the morale of the Qizilbash in the light of military victories.
Shah Abbas came to power under conditions in which many provinces, including Fars, Kerman, Isfahan, Kashan, Ardabil, and Gilan, were gripped by the rebellions of khans and governors. At the outset, he issued orders for the execution of several amirs and then proceeded to establish order in the provinces and districts. His next step was war with the Uzbeks, who had occupied Mashhad, Nishapur, Isfarayin, Sabzavar, Mazinan, Jajarm, Shaqaq, and the surrounding regions, and had appointed governors for them. By defeating the Uzbeks, Shah Abbas consolidated Iran's sovereignty over Khurasan through war and nullified their claims. On the western front as well, in 1032 AH, he captured Baghdad and Iraq. He also marched to Huwayza and Luristan, and with the cooperation of the English, expelled the Portuguese from the Persian Gulf, and Jirun (Gombroon), Bahrain, Qeshm, and Hormuz were also returned to Iran's territory. The important victories over the Uzbeks and Ottomans consolidated the position and legitimacy of Shah Abbas.
The Treaty of Peace at Zuhab with the Ottomans marks a turning point in Safavid history. Prior to the conclusion of this treaty, the most important enemy of the Safavids was the Ottoman state. The continuous wars of the Uzbeks and Ottomans with the Safavids had constantly kept Iranians in a state of readiness, strengthened their defensive capabilities, focused attention on borders, and led to the reform of the military structure. However, from the time of the conclusion of the Peace of Zuhab until the fall of Isfahan to the Afghans, no war occurred between the Safavids and the Ottomans. The Uzbeks likewise distanced themselves from the atmosphere of war and became embroiled in internal disputes. This situation led to a decline in the army's readiness, the abandonment of the borders, and laxity in guarding them. The prolonged peace with the Ottomans and the absence of war with the Uzbeks distanced the Safavid kings from the battlefield, drove the army into passivity, and removed the forces from the atmosphere of competition, which had served to strengthen their combat capability.