نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار گروه تاریخ، دانشگاه باقرالعلوم(ع)،قم،ایران
2 دانش آموخته دکتری تاریخ اسلام، دانشگاه باقرالعلوم(ع)،قم،ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
This article aims to conduct a critical, interdisciplinary (historical-jurisprudential) study of one of the prominent cases where the Prophetic Sīrah (life and conduct) is cited for the inference (istinbāṭ) of legal rulings (aḥkām). As a case study, this research examines the "Campaign (Ghazwa) of Banu al-Muṣṭaliq" and how Imāmī (Shi’a) and Sunnī jurists have cited this event to prove the "permissibility of launching a surprise attack against the enemy". The ultimate objective is to demonstrate the crucial point that an uncritical and selective reliance on a single historical report, without considering competing reports, evaluating their chain of transmission (isnad) and content (matn), and assessing it against the entirety of the Prophetic Sīrah, can lead to the inference of rulings that not only lack a solid historical foundation but may also conflict with the ethical and legal principles governing warfare in Islam. This research seeks to clarify a correct methodology for utilizing history in jurisprudential inference and derivation. The central question of this research has two levels: At the historical level: between the two conflicting reports concerning how the battle of Banu al-Muṣṭaliq began (the report of calling to Islam before battle and the report of a surprise attack), which is more credible and why? At the jurisprudential level: Assuming this conflict exists, on what methodological basis have a number of earlier and later Shīʿa and Sunnī jurists chosen only the report of the surprise attack and, based on it, derived the ruling of the permissibility (ibāḥa) (and in some cases, recommendation (istiḥbāb)) of a surprise attack – even without the need to re-issue a call to an enemy who had previously received the call to Islam? Is this derivation compatible with the principle of "prioritizing the call over fighting" (taqdīm al-daʿwah ʿalā al-qitāl), which is emphasized in other texts and the continuous (mustamirr) Prophetic Sīrah?
This research employs a descriptive-analytical method, with data collected through library research. The methodological framework of the article combines analytical historiography and comparative jurisprudence (fiqh muqāran). The process was as follows: First, all reports concerning the nature of the commencement of the Banu al-Muṣṭaliq campaign were extracted from the most important historical, ḥadīth, and Sīrah sources of both schools, prioritizing early and primary sources. These were then organized into two completely distinct and contradictory categories. Second, through direct reference to jurisprudential and argumentative (istidlālī) works of both schools (from early to later jurisprudence), all instances of citing this campaign as proof for the permissibility of surprise attacks, along with the exact wording of the jurists' arguments, were collected and categorized.
In the analysis phase, the article critically evaluates the historical reports internally, considering the preferences of specialized historians (such as al-Wāqidī and Ibn Saʿd). Subsequently, it conducts an external analysis, assessing each report against the definitive (qaṭʿī) Prophetic Sīrah in other events and general directives related to jihād (e.g., the command to Imam ʿAlī (AS) in Yemen and Khaybar, the prohibition of night raids (tabyīt), and the emphasis on an initial call). Finally, the jurists’ methods of argumentation are critiqued from the perspective of the principles of citing history in jurisprudence (e.g., addressing conflicting reports, rational reconciliation (jamʿ ʿaqlī), and recourse to external indications (qarāʾin khārijīyyah)).
The significant findings of this research are:
The existence of an evident and unresolved conflict at the historical core of the issue: Sources present two completely different "narrations" (riwāyāt) of how this campaign began; accepting one leads to opposing jurisprudential conclusions.
The predominance of a selective and uncritical approach in jurisprudential citation: The results indicate that many of the jurists examined (from al-Shāfiʿī and al-Sarakhsī to Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī, and Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir) merely relied on citing a specific historical statement ("that the Prophet (SAWA) raided Banu al-Muṣṭaliq..."), without:
- Acknowledging the existence of a conflicting and stronger report (the report of the call).
- Providing a clear reason for preferring their chosen report.
- Critically examining the chain of transmission of the surprise attack report (which typically traces back to ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar).
- Synthesizing this action with the Prophet's other actions in different campaigns.
The preference for the "call" report from the perspective of specialized historiography: The investigation revealed that early, authoritative historians of the Sīrah, such as al-Wāqidī in al-Maghāzī and Ibn Saʿd in al-Ṭabaqāt, explicitly state that the report containing the call is more firmly established and credible. This preference historically weakens the foundation of the jurists’ argument.
The conflict between the surprise attack report and the totality of Prophetic Sīrah: By presenting multiple pieces of evidence from the sources of both schools (the ḥadīth of Yemen, the prohibition of night raids, the statement of Ibn ʿAbbās, etc.), this research clearly demonstrates that a general and emphasized principle in the Prophetic jihādī Sīrah is the "call to Islam before the commencement of armed conflict". The action attributed in the second report, if accepted, appears to be a singular exception requiring special justification, not a rule-establishing (qāʿidah-sāz) proposition.
Jurisprudential-ethical implications: The implication of this jurisprudential derivation could potentially justify indiscriminate attacks and disregard for the opportunity to issue the call and complete the proof (ithmām al-ḥujjah), which conflicts with the spirit of Islamic teachings regarding the protection of non-combatants and the ethics of war.
This research concludes that the derivation of the "permissibility of surprise attack" based on the Prophet's conduct in the Banu al-Muṣṭaliq campaign rests on a weak foundation. This weakness stems not from the absolute invalidity of the Sīrah as a source of jurisprudence, but rather from deficiencies in the methodology employed to utilize it. The article demonstrates that the jurists in question fell into the trap of viewing history through a single narrative and neglected comparative and comprehensive analysis. Correct jurisprudential derivation in such cases requires following logical steps: first, compiling all relevant historical reports and evaluating the credibility of each according to historical and ḥadīth criteria. Second, synthesizing these reports with other Sīrah evidence on the subject to discover the general rule (qāʿidah kulliyyah). Third, in cases of conflict, providing a reasonable justification for preferring one report or specifying (takhṣīṣ) the general rule. In the issue of surprise attacks, this process appears not to have been properly followed, resulting in a fatwā issued on the basis of the weaker report. This research emphasizes the necessity of a critical re-reading of such historical citations in jurisprudence and paying greater attention to the principles of historical criticism and Sīrah studies within the process of deriving legal rulings.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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