نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دکتری، گروه معارف اسلامی، واحد تبریز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تبریز، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
From the beginning, the Abbasid Caliphate had created a centralized method for transferring power with a specific succession mechanism, but in practice, historical developments, intra-family rivalries, and socio-political dichotomies between the Arab-Iranian and Baghdadi-Khorasani currents faced this system with tensions. The peak of these crises occurred in the final decades of the Caliphate of Harun Abbasi; the division of power based on Harun's plan among his three sons, especially Amin and Ma'mun, led to structural inflammation and an escalation of conflict between the forces of power. The fall of the Barmakid dynasty and the weakening of the Khorasani support of the government also complicated these conditions and created opposition within the caliphate structure, and finally, after his death, it intensified to such an extent that it plunged the Abbasid Caliphate into a severe war between two brothers. Thus, the structure of the Abbasid Caliphate was torn apart as a result of the dual Arab-Iranian pressure and the competition between the Baghdadi and Khorasani factions, and this rift weakened the political legitimacy of the caliphate. The present study, understanding the importance of this sensitive period and its role in the formation of an unprecedented policy such as the succession of Imam Reza (A.S), attempts to show, based on the "Mitrof crisis management" model, that Al-Ma'mun's new approach in inviting the Imam (A.S) to the caliphate and offering him the succession, was not a propaganda act, but part of a conscious and structurally disruptive strategy to contain the complex crises of the government. Therefore, the main issue of the research is whether, by adding a new dimension to the power structure, that is, introducing an Alawite element, Al-Ma'mun intended to change the balance of competing forces in his favor and manage the crises of legitimacy, identity, and power cohesion. By placing the issue in the framework of "crisis management", the research allows for a more structural and scientific analysis of Al-Ma'mun's performance and shows that this action was part of the process of reconstructing the identity of power in a critical situation. In the meantime, understanding the cause-and-effect relationships between the structural crises before Al-Ma'mun's caliphate, the unstable conditions after the civil war, and the need to redefine the balance of forces becomes doubly important. Thus, the crisis of power identity, with the weakening
of the symbolic authority of the caliphate, the distrust of the elites, and the spread of opposition rebellions, made the government's situation even more unstable than before. This instability forced Ma'mun to use an ideological rival, contrary to the common Abbasid tradition, to use him to repair the power structure instead of eliminating him. By proposing the succession of Imam Reza (A.S), Ma'mun not only sought to compensate for the lack of religious and social legitimacy of the caliphate, but also tried to create a kind of "third side of power", reorganize the balance of Arab and Iranian forces and prevent the collapse of his power. Therefore, the succession of Imam Reza (A.S) was a tactical and strategic response to the crises of legitimacy, structure, and identity of the caliphate. An action that, although ultimately not continued for various historical reasons, was able to
کلیدواژهها [English]
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