Baqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622A Qualitative Content Analysis of Ibn Hishām’s Reports concerning the Prophet’s encountering
with the Verbal Opposition in MedinaA Qualitative Content Analysis of Ibn Hishām’s Reports concerning the Prophet’s encountering
with the Verbal Opposition in Medina3077843410.22081/hiq.2025.71033.2442FAPariaKarbasianPh.D., Student, Department of Quranic Studies and Hadith, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Alzahra University, Tehran, IranZahraSarfiAssistant Professor, Department of Quran and Hadith Sciences, Faculty of Theology, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran.HamidrezaMotahariAssistant Professor, Department of Ahl al-Bayt (AS), Research Institute for History and Ahl al-Bayt (AS), Research Institute for Islamic Sciences and Culture, Qom, IranJournal Article20250208One of the essential requirements for appreciating the early Islamic history is the study of opposition faced by the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) during the Medinan period and his modes of response. This study specifically examines verbal opposition to the Prophet (PBUH) in Medina, as recorded in Sīrah Ibn Hishām, and presents its findings through the method of qualitative content analysis. It seeks to answer the question on how the Prophet Moḥammad (PBUH) dealt with the verbal opposition expressed by the Muslims, People of the Book, and even the polytheists being under his sovereignty. The findings reveal that the verbal opposition during the Medinan period falls into the five categories: first, defying the Prophet’s commands, such as the opposition of some Muslims towards the Prophet’s decision in signing the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyah; second, insult and mockery, such as Battle of the Trench when Muʿtab ibn Qoshayr sarcastically derided the Prophet’s promises while mocking the Muslims’ plight; third, attempts to nullify the Prophet’s orders, such as Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb’s resistance to adhering to the treaty of Ḥudaybiyah; fourth, complaints about officials, such as Refāʿ ibn Zaid’s complaint regarding Zaid ibn Ḥāritha’s killing of tribesmen and seizure of their families and property; and the fifth, supporting traitors, exemplified by Abū ʿAfak and ʿAṣmāʾ bent e-Marwān, who satirized the Prophet (PBUH) and overtly showing hostility after the killing of Hareth ibn Sovayd ibn Samet. Within the category of defiance, two core themes emerge: rejection of military orders—the most frequent type of opposition, as in Saʿd ibn Maʿādh’s objection to taking prisoners at Badr—and contesting the prophet’s decisions about the war booty, as Anṣār’s protest over the distribution of spoils at Ḥunayn battle. Similarly, insult and mockery includes two subthemes: insults directed at the Prophet (PBUH) and mockery of the Muslims. The Prophet’s (PBUH) responses reflected his adherence to the principles such as the social rights, unity and cohesion, freedom of choice and expression, justice, respect for the sanctity of Muslim lives and honor, and commitment to the political treaties. The most frequent response was the forbearance and leniency, such as his initial patience toward the taunts of the Bani Qaynqāʿ or toward Zaid ibn Luṣayt, who mocked the Prophet (PBUH) after he lost his camel on the return from Tabūk; in both cases, the Prophet refrained from harsh retaliation and thereby left room for repentance and reintegration. Other modes of response, in descending order of frequency, included persuasion of opponents (e.g., convincing skeptics of the Ḥudaybiyah treaty, acceptance of suggestions (e.g., agreeing with the Anṣār not to hand over Medinan dates to the Ghatafān during the Trench), redress and compensation (e.g., sending ʿAli (PBUH) to make amends for Zaid ibn Ḥāritha’s actions against the Jadhīma tribe), and finally punishment, verbal or physical (e.g., the execution orders against Abū ʿAfak and ʿAṣmāʾ for inflammatory poetry against the Muslims). Overall, the reports demonstrate that the Prophet (PBUH) sought to minimize unnecessary conflicts by employing rational, strategic, and flexible methods—balancing principles with pragmatism—in order to preserve social cohesion and advance the divine mission with minimal cost to the community. Moreover, he distinguished between opposition directed at himself as Moḥammad ibn Abdullah (PBUH), a member of society, and opposition to his position as Prophet and political leader of the Muslim community: while he tolerated personal slights with patience, he did not tolerate challenges to the position of prophethood and the governance of the Islamic polity.One of the essential requirements for appreciating the early Islamic history is the study of opposition faced by the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) during the Medinan period and his modes of response. This study specifically examines verbal opposition to the Prophet (PBUH) in Medina, as recorded in Sīrah Ibn Hishām, and presents its findings through the method of qualitative content analysis. It seeks to answer the question on how the Prophet Moḥammad (PBUH) dealt with the verbal opposition expressed by the Muslims, People of the Book, and even the polytheists being under his sovereignty. The findings reveal that the verbal opposition during the Medinan period falls into the five categories: first, defying the Prophet’s commands, such as the opposition of some Muslims towards the Prophet’s decision in signing the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyah; second, insult and mockery, such as Battle of the Trench when Muʿtab ibn Qoshayr sarcastically derided the Prophet’s promises while mocking the Muslims’ plight; third, attempts to nullify the Prophet’s orders, such as Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb’s resistance to adhering to the treaty of Ḥudaybiyah; fourth, complaints about officials, such as Refāʿ ibn Zaid’s complaint regarding Zaid ibn Ḥāritha’s killing of tribesmen and seizure of their families and property; and the fifth, supporting traitors, exemplified by Abū ʿAfak and ʿAṣmāʾ bent e-Marwān, who satirized the Prophet (PBUH) and overtly showing hostility after the killing of Hareth ibn Sovayd ibn Samet. Within the category of defiance, two core themes emerge: rejection of military orders—the most frequent type of opposition, as in Saʿd ibn Maʿādh’s objection to taking prisoners at Badr—and contesting the prophet’s decisions about the war booty, as Anṣār’s protest over the distribution of spoils at Ḥunayn battle. Similarly, insult and mockery includes two subthemes: insults directed at the Prophet (PBUH) and mockery of the Muslims. The Prophet’s (PBUH) responses reflected his adherence to the principles such as the social rights, unity and cohesion, freedom of choice and expression, justice, respect for the sanctity of Muslim lives and honor, and commitment to the political treaties. The most frequent response was the forbearance and leniency, such as his initial patience toward the taunts of the Bani Qaynqāʿ or toward Zaid ibn Luṣayt, who mocked the Prophet (PBUH) after he lost his camel on the return from Tabūk; in both cases, the Prophet refrained from harsh retaliation and thereby left room for repentance and reintegration. Other modes of response, in descending order of frequency, included persuasion of opponents (e.g., convincing skeptics of the Ḥudaybiyah treaty, acceptance of suggestions (e.g., agreeing with the Anṣār not to hand over Medinan dates to the Ghatafān during the Trench), redress and compensation (e.g., sending ʿAli (PBUH) to make amends for Zaid ibn Ḥāritha’s actions against the Jadhīma tribe), and finally punishment, verbal or physical (e.g., the execution orders against Abū ʿAfak and ʿAṣmāʾ for inflammatory poetry against the Muslims). Overall, the reports demonstrate that the Prophet (PBUH) sought to minimize unnecessary conflicts by employing rational, strategic, and flexible methods—balancing principles with pragmatism—in order to preserve social cohesion and advance the divine mission with minimal cost to the community. Moreover, he distinguished between opposition directed at himself as Moḥammad ibn Abdullah (PBUH), a member of society, and opposition to his position as Prophet and political leader of the Muslim community: while he tolerated personal slights with patience, he did not tolerate challenges to the position of prophethood and the governance of the Islamic polity.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_78434_4e79883af4492ade9e56db91a60fb043.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622The Contribution of Al-Tabari’s Historiography
to the Development of Biased Perceptions: A Case Study on the Prophet Muhammad’s relying on Violence in the Islamic Da'vahThe Contribution of Al-Tabari’s Historiography
to the Development of Biased Perceptions: A Case Study on the Prophet Muhammad’s relying on Violence in the Islamic Da'vah52317843510.22081/hiq.2023.63728.2253FALeilaNajafianrazaviDepartment of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, IranYasamanYariPhD., Department of Islamic History, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20220507Alongside the meticulous recording of Qur'anic verses, the life and conduct of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as a religious model for Muslims, attracted significant attention from early Islamic scholars and writers, to the extent that even the Prophet's gaze or facial expressions during specific events were carefully documented. This meticulous attention laid the foundation for Islamic historiography, which emerged as one of the earliest sciences in Islamic civilization and significantly influenced the development of various perceptions about the Prophet in later periods—some of which, whether intentionally or unintentionally, presented a biased portrayal of his life. Among these perceptions is the image of Islam as a religion spread by the sword, a notion that has been perpetuated over time. A major part of this skewed portrayal originates from the way early Islamic authors, particularly in their treatment of the Prophet’s military campaigns, emphasized violence<br />in the Prophet’s methods of expanding Islam, while others—due to either academic shortcomings or lack of critical perspective—reproduced these narratives. This trend was further reinforced in post-18th century orientalist writings, where references to Islamic sources lent a pseudo-academic legitimacy to these biases. Central to this process is Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923 CE) and his seminal work Tārīkh al-Umam wa al-Mulūk (commonly known as Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī), which holds an indispensable position in Islamic historiography, particularly due to its preservation of otherwise lost earlier sources and its comprehensive inclusion of diverse narratives. The prominence of Ṭabarī’s account in subsequent historical texts has rendered it highly influential in shaping prevailing perceptions of the Prophet’s life among Western scholars. One of the most critical of these perceptions is the notion that the Prophet predominantly employed violence in spreading Islam. This study seeks to assess the extent to which violence was highlighted in Ṭabarī’s portrayal of the Prophet, in contrast to his other peaceful methods such as preaching, education, treaty-making, and trust-building. By defining independent variables for both peaceful and forceful methods—such as verbal invitation, kind behavior toward opponents versus conflict, threats, war, assassination, exile, execution of captives, and retaliation—the study reveals that Ṭabarī's historical narrative significantly amplifies acts of violence, while relegating the Prophet’s peaceful strategies to the margins.Alongside the meticulous recording of Qur'anic verses, the life and conduct of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as a religious model for Muslims, attracted significant attention from early Islamic scholars and writers, to the extent that even the Prophet's gaze or facial expressions during specific events were carefully documented. This meticulous attention laid the foundation for Islamic historiography, which emerged as one of the earliest sciences in Islamic civilization and significantly influenced the development of various perceptions about the Prophet in later periods—some of which, whether intentionally or unintentionally, presented a biased portrayal of his life. Among these perceptions is the image of Islam as a religion spread by the sword, a notion that has been perpetuated over time. A major part of this skewed portrayal originates from the way early Islamic authors, particularly in their treatment of the Prophet’s military campaigns, emphasized violence<br />in the Prophet’s methods of expanding Islam, while others—due to either academic shortcomings or lack of critical perspective—reproduced these narratives. This trend was further reinforced in post-18th century orientalist writings, where references to Islamic sources lent a pseudo-academic legitimacy to these biases. Central to this process is Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923 CE) and his seminal work Tārīkh al-Umam wa al-Mulūk (commonly known as Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī), which holds an indispensable position in Islamic historiography, particularly due to its preservation of otherwise lost earlier sources and its comprehensive inclusion of diverse narratives. The prominence of Ṭabarī’s account in subsequent historical texts has rendered it highly influential in shaping prevailing perceptions of the Prophet’s life among Western scholars. One of the most critical of these perceptions is the notion that the Prophet predominantly employed violence in spreading Islam. This study seeks to assess the extent to which violence was highlighted in Ṭabarī’s portrayal of the Prophet, in contrast to his other peaceful methods such as preaching, education, treaty-making, and trust-building. By defining independent variables for both peaceful and forceful methods—such as verbal invitation, kind behavior toward opponents versus conflict, threats, war, assassination, exile, execution of captives, and retaliation—the study reveals that Ṭabarī's historical narrative significantly amplifies acts of violence, while relegating the Prophet’s peaceful strategies to the margins.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_78435_e689b5ab5600a2616bfacc3668edddce.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622A Study on the Sources of the Letters attributed
to Imam Hassan al-ʿAskarī (PBUH)A Study on the Sources of the Letters attributed
to Imam Hassan al-ʿAskarī (PBUH)82537754310.22081/hiq.2024.68783.2381FAMohammadZareBoushehriAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic History, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, IranJournal Article20240325The Imams’ letters are among the most important legacies of Imāmī Shiʿism, and their study is significant from various perspectives. Although some scholars have collected these letters, their different dimensions have not yet been thoroughly analyzed. A proper examination of these letters depends first on identifying their sources, and then on studying their chains of transmission and textual content. This article, employing a descriptive method and drawing upon a range of early works, investigates the sources of Imam Hassan al-ʿAskarī’s letters. It seeks to answer two key questions on which sources and works<br />from the past to the present have transmitted the letters; and what are the reliability, characteristics, and typologies of these sources, and in which centuries are these letters most frequently reflected. Imam al-ʿAskarī (PBUH), due to the particular conditions of his time, was summoned from Medina to Iraq along with his father Imam al-Hādī (PBUH) in 234 A.H, under compulsion and surveillance in Sāmarrāʾ, the ʿAbbāsid capital (132–656 A.H). Following the martyrdom of his noble father in 254 A.H, his Imamate—lasting only six years—began at the age of twenty-two. Until his martyrdom in 260 A.H, Imam<br />al-ʿAskarī (PBUH) lived under the governance of three ʿAbbāsid caliphs. In addition to the crucial task of preparing the ground for the occultation of his son, Imam al-Mahdī (PBUH), he also considered the doctrinal and social needs of the community. Given the restrictions imposed on him, his main means of communication with his followers was through the letters. Despite the brevity of his Imamate, 130 letters in seven thematic areas—tawḥīd (monotheism), imamate, miracles and extraordinary reports, jurisprudence, supplication, exhortations, and overstatement—have been transmitted in various sources. In Makātīb<br />al-Aʾimma, Aḥmadī Miyānjī reported 138 letters attributed to Imam al-ʿAskarī (PBUH); however, in the author’s view, nine of these do not qualify as letters, and one contains two separate letters; so, 130 letters are totally accurate. The majority of these letters appear in ḥadīth collections, while others are preserved in works of history and biography, ethics, and rijāl. This study, based on volume six of Makātīb al-Aʾimma by Ayatollah Aḥmadī Miyānjī (d. 1379 A.H), categorizes the sources of the letters into seven types: ḥadīth, sīrah, history,virtues and merits, rijāl, supplications and devotional practices, jurisprudence, and ethics. For the purpose of criticizing each source, the authors and their works are examined in light of biographical dictionaries (kutub al-rijāl) and other relevant literature in order to determine the reliability of each letter. The frequency of letters cited in various sources is also presented in tabular form. Additionally, other related works are surveyed, with attention to chronology, in order to ensure that the repeated letters are not counted twice. This analysis demonstrates that the transmitting the sources of these letters are, for the most part, reliable and worthy of scholarly reference. The majority of the letters are found in the Shiʿi ḥadīth and historical-sīrah sources of the fourth-century. About 71 letters are reported in the works of the fourth-century, 66 of them are preserved in three of the Four Books of Shiʿism (al-Kāfī, Tahdhīb, and Man Lā Yaḥḍar al-Faqīh), which greatly enhances their authenticity and significance. The additional nine letters are cited from other writings of the compilers of the Four Books. Some letters appear in later sources such as Biḥār al-Anwār and Madīnat al-Maʿājiz, which are of lower rank in terms of reliability. A single report is found in Hidāyat al-Kubrā by Hussain ibn Ḥamdān Khaṣībī; if this work is attributed to his earlier, pre-exaggeration phase, its authenticity is not in doubt. Eight letters are transmitted in Ithbāt al-Waṣiya and Dalāʾil al-Imāmah, though the disputed authorship of these two works requires greater caution in evaluating their reliability. In conclusion, this study finds that the majority of the letters attributed to Imam Hassan al-ʿAskarī (PBUH) are preserved in credible sources.The Imams’ letters are among the most important legacies of Imāmī Shiʿism, and their study is significant from various perspectives. Although some scholars have collected these letters, their different dimensions have not yet been thoroughly analyzed. A proper examination of these letters depends first on identifying their sources, and then on studying their chains of transmission and textual content. This article, employing a descriptive method and drawing upon a range of early works, investigates the sources of Imam Hassan al-ʿAskarī’s letters. It seeks to answer two key questions on which sources and works<br />from the past to the present have transmitted the letters; and what are the reliability, characteristics, and typologies of these sources, and in which centuries are these letters most frequently reflected. Imam al-ʿAskarī (PBUH), due to the particular conditions of his time, was summoned from Medina to Iraq along with his father Imam al-Hādī (PBUH) in 234 A.H, under compulsion and surveillance in Sāmarrāʾ, the ʿAbbāsid capital (132–656 A.H). Following the martyrdom of his noble father in 254 A.H, his Imamate—lasting only six years—began at the age of twenty-two. Until his martyrdom in 260 A.H, Imam<br />al-ʿAskarī (PBUH) lived under the governance of three ʿAbbāsid caliphs. In addition to the crucial task of preparing the ground for the occultation of his son, Imam al-Mahdī (PBUH), he also considered the doctrinal and social needs of the community. Given the restrictions imposed on him, his main means of communication with his followers was through the letters. Despite the brevity of his Imamate, 130 letters in seven thematic areas—tawḥīd (monotheism), imamate, miracles and extraordinary reports, jurisprudence, supplication, exhortations, and overstatement—have been transmitted in various sources. In Makātīb<br />al-Aʾimma, Aḥmadī Miyānjī reported 138 letters attributed to Imam al-ʿAskarī (PBUH); however, in the author’s view, nine of these do not qualify as letters, and one contains two separate letters; so, 130 letters are totally accurate. The majority of these letters appear in ḥadīth collections, while others are preserved in works of history and biography, ethics, and rijāl. This study, based on volume six of Makātīb al-Aʾimma by Ayatollah Aḥmadī Miyānjī (d. 1379 A.H), categorizes the sources of the letters into seven types: ḥadīth, sīrah, history,virtues and merits, rijāl, supplications and devotional practices, jurisprudence, and ethics. For the purpose of criticizing each source, the authors and their works are examined in light of biographical dictionaries (kutub al-rijāl) and other relevant literature in order to determine the reliability of each letter. The frequency of letters cited in various sources is also presented in tabular form. Additionally, other related works are surveyed, with attention to chronology, in order to ensure that the repeated letters are not counted twice. This analysis demonstrates that the transmitting the sources of these letters are, for the most part, reliable and worthy of scholarly reference. The majority of the letters are found in the Shiʿi ḥadīth and historical-sīrah sources of the fourth-century. About 71 letters are reported in the works of the fourth-century, 66 of them are preserved in three of the Four Books of Shiʿism (al-Kāfī, Tahdhīb, and Man Lā Yaḥḍar al-Faqīh), which greatly enhances their authenticity and significance. The additional nine letters are cited from other writings of the compilers of the Four Books. Some letters appear in later sources such as Biḥār al-Anwār and Madīnat al-Maʿājiz, which are of lower rank in terms of reliability. A single report is found in Hidāyat al-Kubrā by Hussain ibn Ḥamdān Khaṣībī; if this work is attributed to his earlier, pre-exaggeration phase, its authenticity is not in doubt. Eight letters are transmitted in Ithbāt al-Waṣiya and Dalāʾil al-Imāmah, though the disputed authorship of these two works requires greater caution in evaluating their reliability. In conclusion, this study finds that the majority of the letters attributed to Imam Hassan al-ʿAskarī (PBUH) are preserved in credible sources.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_77543_06f2235dff2d9047fedb0c83526c7cad.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622The Transmission of Abyssinian Heritage to
the Arabian Peninsula by the Muslim EmigrantsThe Transmission of Abyssinian Heritage to
the Arabian Peninsula by the Muslim Emigrants102837843610.22081/hiq.2023.60812.2170FAMahdiMojtahediAssistant Professor, Department of History and Civilization of Islamic Nations, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran0000-0002-3987-1896SomayyeAghaMohammadiHistory and Civilization of Islamic Nations, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran.Journal Article20210430Abyssinia, an ancient land in East Africa with a civilization spanning over two millennia, was the first refuge of a group of the Prophet’s Companions. Before Islam had firmly spread in Arabia, it was introduced to Abyssinia during the first migration, marking a turning point in the history of Islam’s expansion. Yet, a question rarely examined is whether the emigrants, upon their return to the Hejaz, brought back elements of Abyssinian heritage, customs, and practices. This study has examined the existing reports using a descriptive-analytical method. In the event of the Hijrah, a number of Muslims migrated to Abyssinia at the command of the Prophet (PBUH) to be under the protection of the Negus. Abyssinia was not an unknown land for the Arabs, and they had traveled there for trade before Islam. The Muslims who migrated to Abyssinia lived in Abyssinia until the seventh year of the Hijrah, that is, for 15 years, and due to their long stay, they were naturally influenced by the social environment there. As a result, after returning, they brought part of the cultural and social heritage of this land to the Arabian Peninsula. The most important of these legacies were: a dowry of four thousand dirhams. During the time of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the dowry for women was twelve and a half ounces, equivalent<br />to approximately five thousand dirhams or five hundred dinars, and some followed his tradition. During the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, most Muslims followed the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). During the Umayyad period, the dowry was often four thousand dirhams, and some caliphs also placed great emphasis on this amount of dowry. Regarding the origin of this amount, sources state that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) sent a messenger to Negus to request marriage with Umm Habiba, one of the women who had immigrated to Abyssinia. Negus set a dowry of four thousand dirhams or four hundred dinars for Umm Habiba. This became a tradition, especially during the Umayyad period, because Umm Habiba was the sister of Muawiyah, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty. It seems that this led them to set the amount of Umm Habiba's dowry as a standard for all Muslim women in order to raise the status of Muawiyah's family and his sister among Muslims. The covered coffin is the second legacy that was transferred from Abyssinia to the Islamic society. The coffin was common among the Arabs before Islam, but its covered form was a tradition derived from Abyssinian culture that became popular in the early Islamic period and during the death of Hazrat Fatima (PBUH). The narration related to the coffin has been narrated in different forms in the sources. Although there are differences in the narrators and even for whom the first covered coffin was made, all sources agree that Asma bent Umays first taught using such coffin according to what she learned from the burial ceremonies of the Abyssinians. It is narrated that Hazrat Fatima (PBUH) said to Asma bint Umays: How disgusting are the coffins that are made for women; because in them a covering is thrown over the body and the body of the deceased is visible to the people. Asma asked for fresh pieces of wood and smoothed them and tied them tightly together, and then she threw a cloth over them. Upon seeing that coffin, Hazrat Fatima (PBUH) said: What a beautiful coffin in which it is not clear whether the deceased one is a man or a woman. Hazrat Fatima (PBUH) asked him to make such a coffin for her too. Since most sources also refer to the making of the first coffin for Hazrat Fatima (PBUH), it can be concluded that the first coffin in the Abyssinian style was related to the coffin of Hazrat Fatima (PBUH). The third legacy that was transferred to the Islamic community by the Abyssinian immigrants was some herbal medicines. For example, when the Messenger of God (PBUH) was sick and physically weak, they rubbed a herbal concoction into his mouth. The concoction was made from a mixture of several herbal medicines having been learned by Asmaa, daughter of Umays, from the land of Abyssinia.Abyssinia, an ancient land in East Africa with a civilization spanning over two millennia, was the first refuge of a group of the Prophet’s Companions. Before Islam had firmly spread in Arabia, it was introduced to Abyssinia during the first migration, marking a turning point in the history of Islam’s expansion. Yet, a question rarely examined is whether the emigrants, upon their return to the Hejaz, brought back elements of Abyssinian heritage, customs, and practices. This study has examined the existing reports using a descriptive-analytical method. In the event of the Hijrah, a number of Muslims migrated to Abyssinia at the command of the Prophet (PBUH) to be under the protection of the Negus. Abyssinia was not an unknown land for the Arabs, and they had traveled there for trade before Islam. The Muslims who migrated to Abyssinia lived in Abyssinia until the seventh year of the Hijrah, that is, for 15 years, and due to their long stay, they were naturally influenced by the social environment there. As a result, after returning, they brought part of the cultural and social heritage of this land to the Arabian Peninsula. The most important of these legacies were: a dowry of four thousand dirhams. During the time of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the dowry for women was twelve and a half ounces, equivalent<br />to approximately five thousand dirhams or five hundred dinars, and some followed his tradition. During the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, most Muslims followed the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). During the Umayyad period, the dowry was often four thousand dirhams, and some caliphs also placed great emphasis on this amount of dowry. Regarding the origin of this amount, sources state that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) sent a messenger to Negus to request marriage with Umm Habiba, one of the women who had immigrated to Abyssinia. Negus set a dowry of four thousand dirhams or four hundred dinars for Umm Habiba. This became a tradition, especially during the Umayyad period, because Umm Habiba was the sister of Muawiyah, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty. It seems that this led them to set the amount of Umm Habiba's dowry as a standard for all Muslim women in order to raise the status of Muawiyah's family and his sister among Muslims. The covered coffin is the second legacy that was transferred from Abyssinia to the Islamic society. The coffin was common among the Arabs before Islam, but its covered form was a tradition derived from Abyssinian culture that became popular in the early Islamic period and during the death of Hazrat Fatima (PBUH). The narration related to the coffin has been narrated in different forms in the sources. Although there are differences in the narrators and even for whom the first covered coffin was made, all sources agree that Asma bent Umays first taught using such coffin according to what she learned from the burial ceremonies of the Abyssinians. It is narrated that Hazrat Fatima (PBUH) said to Asma bint Umays: How disgusting are the coffins that are made for women; because in them a covering is thrown over the body and the body of the deceased is visible to the people. Asma asked for fresh pieces of wood and smoothed them and tied them tightly together, and then she threw a cloth over them. Upon seeing that coffin, Hazrat Fatima (PBUH) said: What a beautiful coffin in which it is not clear whether the deceased one is a man or a woman. Hazrat Fatima (PBUH) asked him to make such a coffin for her too. Since most sources also refer to the making of the first coffin for Hazrat Fatima (PBUH), it can be concluded that the first coffin in the Abyssinian style was related to the coffin of Hazrat Fatima (PBUH). The third legacy that was transferred to the Islamic community by the Abyssinian immigrants was some herbal medicines. For example, when the Messenger of God (PBUH) was sick and physically weak, they rubbed a herbal concoction into his mouth. The concoction was made from a mixture of several herbal medicines having been learned by Asmaa, daughter of Umays, from the land of Abyssinia.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_78436_658452918266833247dfbc4d231f3d07.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622The Role of Dissimulation in the Historical Process of Ruling Statement by the Infallibles (PBUT):
A Case Study of the Ruling related to the Fasting on the Day of ʿĀshūrāʾThe Role of Dissimulation in the Historical Process of Ruling Statement by the Infallibles (PBUT):
A Case Study of the Ruling related to the Fasting on the Day of ʿĀshūrāʾ1261037843710.22081/hiq.2022.62528.2221FAMohammd HosseinAfrakhtehNajmehSalehiPh.D., Student, Department of Islamic History, Baqir al-Olum University, Qom, Iran.Journal Article20211127Attention to the vital element of dissimulation is highly instructive both in engaging with the traditions of the Ahl al-Bayt (PBUH) and in analyzing Shiite beliefs and intellectual history. The Imams (PBUT), as leaders of the Shiite community, adopted the practice of dissimulation not only in matters related to the doctrine of Imamate but also<br />in sensitive jurisprudential issues, particularly rulings that carried political or social implications. After the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (PBUH), due to Umayyad propaganda promoting festivities and fasting on the day of ʿĀshūrāʾ, this legal issue acquired a social dimension, as Sunnis and Umayyad could distinguish Shiites from others based on their adherence or non-adherence. Consequently, Imams (PBUT) were compelled to practice dissimulation to protect the lives of their followers. This study, drawing on ḥadīthi, biographical, and historical sources through a library-based method, addresses the question on what role the dissimulation played in the historical trajectory of rulings on fasting<br />on ʿĀshūrāʾday. Alongside the general type of dissimulation directed toward Sunnis, a particular form is identified whereby Imams (PBUH) articulated dissimulation -based rulings to their own Shiite followers—what may be termed “dissimulation for the benefit of Shiites.” Owing to the intellectual, political, and social dominance of Sunnis under the Umayyad, the residence of transmitters in Sunni-majority cities, or their direct contact with Sunni authorities, the Imams sometimes echoed Sunni positions for the protection of their community. In this framework, narrations concerning fasting on ʿĀshūrāʾ day in Umayyad era emphasized virtues resembling Sunni reports and were transmitted to Sunni scholars, Shiite subgroups such as the Zaidi under Sunnites’ influence, or Imāmī transmitters living in Sunni-majority centers like Mecca and Basra. By contrast, in the late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid period, as political and social constraints eased, the need for dissimulation declined, and reports condemning the fast emerged. These prohibitive narrations either simply forbade the fast or associated it with severe punishment, and notably, they were all transmitted in the ʿAbbāsid era by Imāmī transmitters residing in Kufa, a Shiite-majority city. Accordingly, Imams (PBUT) moved from a strategy of cautious affirmation under dissimulation to outright prohibition when conditions allowed. Considering this crucial aspect of Ahl al-Bayt’s (PBUT) scientific and practical conduct can illuminate other contested legal issues between Sunnites and Shiites and offer valuable insights into the broader history of Shiite thought.Attention to the vital element of dissimulation is highly instructive both in engaging with the traditions of the Ahl al-Bayt (PBUH) and in analyzing Shiite beliefs and intellectual history. The Imams (PBUT), as leaders of the Shiite community, adopted the practice of dissimulation not only in matters related to the doctrine of Imamate but also<br />in sensitive jurisprudential issues, particularly rulings that carried political or social implications. After the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (PBUH), due to Umayyad propaganda promoting festivities and fasting on the day of ʿĀshūrāʾ, this legal issue acquired a social dimension, as Sunnis and Umayyad could distinguish Shiites from others based on their adherence or non-adherence. Consequently, Imams (PBUT) were compelled to practice dissimulation to protect the lives of their followers. This study, drawing on ḥadīthi, biographical, and historical sources through a library-based method, addresses the question on what role the dissimulation played in the historical trajectory of rulings on fasting<br />on ʿĀshūrāʾday. Alongside the general type of dissimulation directed toward Sunnis, a particular form is identified whereby Imams (PBUH) articulated dissimulation -based rulings to their own Shiite followers—what may be termed “dissimulation for the benefit of Shiites.” Owing to the intellectual, political, and social dominance of Sunnis under the Umayyad, the residence of transmitters in Sunni-majority cities, or their direct contact with Sunni authorities, the Imams sometimes echoed Sunni positions for the protection of their community. In this framework, narrations concerning fasting on ʿĀshūrāʾ day in Umayyad era emphasized virtues resembling Sunni reports and were transmitted to Sunni scholars, Shiite subgroups such as the Zaidi under Sunnites’ influence, or Imāmī transmitters living in Sunni-majority centers like Mecca and Basra. By contrast, in the late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid period, as political and social constraints eased, the need for dissimulation declined, and reports condemning the fast emerged. These prohibitive narrations either simply forbade the fast or associated it with severe punishment, and notably, they were all transmitted in the ʿAbbāsid era by Imāmī transmitters residing in Kufa, a Shiite-majority city. Accordingly, Imams (PBUT) moved from a strategy of cautious affirmation under dissimulation to outright prohibition when conditions allowed. Considering this crucial aspect of Ahl al-Bayt’s (PBUT) scientific and practical conduct can illuminate other contested legal issues between Sunnites and Shiites and offer valuable insights into the broader history of Shiite thought.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_78437_b87a88e4f8e446bc1ab5a75b07f7af2e.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622The Role of the Political Views of the Alawites in
the Political Life of the Shiites: From Ashura Day to the Rise of the AbbasidsThe Role of the Political Views of the Alawites in
the Political Life of the Shiites: From Ashura Day to the Rise of the Abbasids1501277843810.22081/hiq.2025.69143.2388FASeyyed GhasemRazzaghi MusaviAssistant Professor, Shia History Department, Research Institute for the History and Life of Ahl- al Bayt (AS), Research Institute for Islamic Sciences and Culture, Qom, IranJournal Article20240523Research on the political life of the Shiites in the era of the Imams holds special significance due to their close association with infallible Imams (PBUT). The period following Ashura uprising marks a new phase of political developments for the Shiites whose actions varied in response to the unique conditions after the revolt. Among these, the Alawites prominently influenced the political life of the Shiites. Employing a historical method of research along with the description and analysis of historical reports, this study seeks to answer the question on what impact the political views of the Alawites had on the political life of the Shiites up to the rise of the Abbasids. The unity and cohesion of the Muslim community, established through the efforts of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and his companions, were disrupted immediately after his departure. According to the Shiites’ political thought, God has granted the right of the leadership and governance to the Prophet and subsequently to the infallible Imams (PBUT), making the appointment of an Imam a divine matter and a fundamental principle of faith. In contrast, related to the issue of the government, Sunnites believe in the caliphate system wherein the caliph is chosen through various means such as popular selection, designation by the preceding caliph,<br />or consultation. The primary challenge faced by the Shiites in their relations with other Muslims and non-Shiite rulers stems from this political doctrine, although there are internal differences among Shiites regarding how to confront governments. The critical and oppositional presence of the Hashemites and Alawites in politics resulted from the misguided policies of the Umayyad caliphs—especially the ethnic favoritism of the Umayyad during Othman’s reign (23-35 A.H)—and the political privileges granted to them, which provoked opposition from some social groups. A brief overview of Shiites’ political life until the Abbasid rise reveals changing circumstances and, consequently, diverse Shiites’ reactions, ranging from accommodation and non-military opposition to armed resistance contrasted with the policy of dissimulation practiced by Imams (PBUT). The Twelver Imams and their followers opposed direct armed confrontation and rebellion after Ashura and refrained from military activism. However, other Shiite groups held differing views and undertook various actions. The Kisaniyeh, believing in the Imamate<br />of Mohammad ibn Hanafiyeh (d. 81 A.H), the non-Fatimid son of Imam Ali (PBUH), represented the first schism in Shiites’ political thought by introducing a new doctrine of Imamate. Subsequently, Zaidi Alawites advocated for the necessity of armed resistance, presenting a novel approach to confront the governments. The policy of dissimulation advanced by Imam Baqer (PBUH) and Imam Sadeq (PBUH), in a socio-political context where some Shiites felt the need for an active resistance was not accepted by many Shiites, so that, some of whom turned away from the Sadeqin and aligned themselves with the revolutionary views of Zaid ibn Ali (d. 122 A.H), and formed a new group. The Hassanid Alawites comprised a third group, further contributing to divisions among the Shiites. Descendants of Imam Hassan al-Mojtaba (PBUH), especially during the era of the Sadeqin (PBUT), largely did not follow the political approaches of the infallible Imams (PBUT) and briefly embraced the revolutionary and anti- dissimulation ideas of Zaid. The historical accounts indicate significant political differences among the Alawites, resulting in two main approaches: (1) a political-theological approach based on reform advocated by the followers of Imams (PBUT), and (2) a political-military approach aligned with opponents of the caliphate. This fragmentation led to a lack of cohesion in Shiites’ political life, divergence in methods of resistance, and ultimately the emergence of new sects. Contrary to the military opposition pursued by some Alawites, the primary aim of the dissimulation policy of the Imams (PBUT) was to preserve the security and stabilize the social, political, and economic status of the Shiites, while avoiding retaliatory measures from the caliphate against the Imams and their followers.Research on the political life of the Shiites in the era of the Imams holds special significance due to their close association with infallible Imams (PBUT). The period following Ashura uprising marks a new phase of political developments for the Shiites whose actions varied in response to the unique conditions after the revolt. Among these, the Alawites prominently influenced the political life of the Shiites. Employing a historical method of research along with the description and analysis of historical reports, this study seeks to answer the question on what impact the political views of the Alawites had on the political life of the Shiites up to the rise of the Abbasids. The unity and cohesion of the Muslim community, established through the efforts of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and his companions, were disrupted immediately after his departure. According to the Shiites’ political thought, God has granted the right of the leadership and governance to the Prophet and subsequently to the infallible Imams (PBUT), making the appointment of an Imam a divine matter and a fundamental principle of faith. In contrast, related to the issue of the government, Sunnites believe in the caliphate system wherein the caliph is chosen through various means such as popular selection, designation by the preceding caliph,<br />or consultation. The primary challenge faced by the Shiites in their relations with other Muslims and non-Shiite rulers stems from this political doctrine, although there are internal differences among Shiites regarding how to confront governments. The critical and oppositional presence of the Hashemites and Alawites in politics resulted from the misguided policies of the Umayyad caliphs—especially the ethnic favoritism of the Umayyad during Othman’s reign (23-35 A.H)—and the political privileges granted to them, which provoked opposition from some social groups. A brief overview of Shiites’ political life until the Abbasid rise reveals changing circumstances and, consequently, diverse Shiites’ reactions, ranging from accommodation and non-military opposition to armed resistance contrasted with the policy of dissimulation practiced by Imams (PBUT). The Twelver Imams and their followers opposed direct armed confrontation and rebellion after Ashura and refrained from military activism. However, other Shiite groups held differing views and undertook various actions. The Kisaniyeh, believing in the Imamate<br />of Mohammad ibn Hanafiyeh (d. 81 A.H), the non-Fatimid son of Imam Ali (PBUH), represented the first schism in Shiites’ political thought by introducing a new doctrine of Imamate. Subsequently, Zaidi Alawites advocated for the necessity of armed resistance, presenting a novel approach to confront the governments. The policy of dissimulation advanced by Imam Baqer (PBUH) and Imam Sadeq (PBUH), in a socio-political context where some Shiites felt the need for an active resistance was not accepted by many Shiites, so that, some of whom turned away from the Sadeqin and aligned themselves with the revolutionary views of Zaid ibn Ali (d. 122 A.H), and formed a new group. The Hassanid Alawites comprised a third group, further contributing to divisions among the Shiites. Descendants of Imam Hassan al-Mojtaba (PBUH), especially during the era of the Sadeqin (PBUT), largely did not follow the political approaches of the infallible Imams (PBUT) and briefly embraced the revolutionary and anti- dissimulation ideas of Zaid. The historical accounts indicate significant political differences among the Alawites, resulting in two main approaches: (1) a political-theological approach based on reform advocated by the followers of Imams (PBUT), and (2) a political-military approach aligned with opponents of the caliphate. This fragmentation led to a lack of cohesion in Shiites’ political life, divergence in methods of resistance, and ultimately the emergence of new sects. Contrary to the military opposition pursued by some Alawites, the primary aim of the dissimulation policy of the Imams (PBUT) was to preserve the security and stabilize the social, political, and economic status of the Shiites, while avoiding retaliatory measures from the caliphate against the Imams and their followers.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_78438_17d6a1ca6a754f44e5159a02d41adbbc.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622Foreign Relations of the Buyids with Sultans of Oman (Banu Wajih and Zangids) During 340-362 A.HForeign Relations of the Buyids with Sultans of Oman (Banu Wajih and Zangids) During 340-362 A.H1681517843910.22081/hiq.2023.62459.2220FASomayeBayatiPh.D., Department of Islamic History, University of Shiraz, Shiraz, IranJournal Article20211119Contemporaneous with the entry of the Buyid dynasty (334-447 A.H) into Baghdad, the Khawarij and Banu Wajih held power in Oman. Khawarij, under the rise of Jalandi ibn Masoud (132-134 A.H), had established the foundations of the first government based on a foreign religion in Oman. When the Buyids entered Baghdad, the Khawarij, who were in their third period of imamate and approaching a phase of dormancy, controlled the interior and mountainous regions such as Nizwa. Banu Wajih family (324-354 A.H), as the main rivals to the Buyids in Oman, along with the Zangids (356-362 A.H), ruled over the ports of Oman including Muscat and Sohar. Following the establishment of the Buyid state in Baghdad, hostile relations between them and the Omani sultans began with a delay of about 18 years. This was because the Buyid attack on Oman to seize control took place in 352 A.H under the order of Mu'izz al-Dawla (334-356 A.H). Although Mu'izz al-Dawla’s forces succeeded in conquering Oman in 355 A.H, the region slipped out of Buyid dominion again following his death and the lack of ministerial attention to maintain control. In 364 A.H, Adud al-Dawla (367-372 A.H), then ruler of Fars, sent an army to fight the Zangids, who had replaced Banu Wajih in Oman. A fierce battle ensued between Adud al-Dawla’s forces and the Zangids, resulting in Oman’s re-annexation to the Buyid realm. Thus, although the Buyid assault on Oman was delayed, until Bahāʾ al-Dawla (379-403 A.H) handed Oman over to Banu Mukarram family (390-448 A.H), the Buyid rulers consistently launched attacks on Oman to counter Khawarij, Banu Wajih, and Zangids. This study, employing a descriptive-analytical method based on the primary historical and geographical sources, seeks to answer the question on what factors influenced the hostile relations between the Buyids and the Omani sultans during 340-362 A.H. The research results indicate that the trade was the most significant factor shaping the antagonistic policy of the Buyids toward Banu Wajih and Zangids of Oman. Oman, located at the entrance of the Persian Gulf and along the trade routes to East Africa and East Asia, encompassed ports such as Sohar, Muscat, Julfar, Nizwa, and Jabal. Therefore, the hostile policy of the Buyids in Iraq towards Banu Wajih stemmed largely from securing the commercial safety of Basrah and the northern Persian Gulf ports like Siraf and Janabah, which faced continuous threats and attacks from Omani sultans. Basrah, being one of the most important ports of the Persian Gulf, connected Eastern and Western trade and was in competition with Omani ports, prompting Omani rulers to attempt to seize Basrah. Furthermore, Oman’s proximity to the northern coasts of the Persian Gulf enabled attacks on Fars and northern Persian Gulf trade ports such as Siniz, Siraf, and Janabah. On the other hand, due to Oman’s commercial importance and the need to control its ports, the Buyids adopted a hostile stance in their relations with the Omani sultans. Oman’s crucial role in East-West trade made it a regional commercial hub. Therefore, for the Buyid princes, who made great emphasis on commerce and trade, Oman was of high value. Medieval Islamic geographers clearly illustrate that contemporaneous with the Buyids in Iraq, the Persian Gulf’s commercial triangle consisted of Basrah, Siraf, and Oman, complementing each other in the movement of trading ships between East and West.Contemporaneous with the entry of the Buyid dynasty (334-447 A.H) into Baghdad, the Khawarij and Banu Wajih held power in Oman. Khawarij, under the rise of Jalandi ibn Masoud (132-134 A.H), had established the foundations of the first government based on a foreign religion in Oman. When the Buyids entered Baghdad, the Khawarij, who were in their third period of imamate and approaching a phase of dormancy, controlled the interior and mountainous regions such as Nizwa. Banu Wajih family (324-354 A.H), as the main rivals to the Buyids in Oman, along with the Zangids (356-362 A.H), ruled over the ports of Oman including Muscat and Sohar. Following the establishment of the Buyid state in Baghdad, hostile relations between them and the Omani sultans began with a delay of about 18 years. This was because the Buyid attack on Oman to seize control took place in 352 A.H under the order of Mu'izz al-Dawla (334-356 A.H). Although Mu'izz al-Dawla’s forces succeeded in conquering Oman in 355 A.H, the region slipped out of Buyid dominion again following his death and the lack of ministerial attention to maintain control. In 364 A.H, Adud al-Dawla (367-372 A.H), then ruler of Fars, sent an army to fight the Zangids, who had replaced Banu Wajih in Oman. A fierce battle ensued between Adud al-Dawla’s forces and the Zangids, resulting in Oman’s re-annexation to the Buyid realm. Thus, although the Buyid assault on Oman was delayed, until Bahāʾ al-Dawla (379-403 A.H) handed Oman over to Banu Mukarram family (390-448 A.H), the Buyid rulers consistently launched attacks on Oman to counter Khawarij, Banu Wajih, and Zangids. This study, employing a descriptive-analytical method based on the primary historical and geographical sources, seeks to answer the question on what factors influenced the hostile relations between the Buyids and the Omani sultans during 340-362 A.H. The research results indicate that the trade was the most significant factor shaping the antagonistic policy of the Buyids toward Banu Wajih and Zangids of Oman. Oman, located at the entrance of the Persian Gulf and along the trade routes to East Africa and East Asia, encompassed ports such as Sohar, Muscat, Julfar, Nizwa, and Jabal. Therefore, the hostile policy of the Buyids in Iraq towards Banu Wajih stemmed largely from securing the commercial safety of Basrah and the northern Persian Gulf ports like Siraf and Janabah, which faced continuous threats and attacks from Omani sultans. Basrah, being one of the most important ports of the Persian Gulf, connected Eastern and Western trade and was in competition with Omani ports, prompting Omani rulers to attempt to seize Basrah. Furthermore, Oman’s proximity to the northern coasts of the Persian Gulf enabled attacks on Fars and northern Persian Gulf trade ports such as Siniz, Siraf, and Janabah. On the other hand, due to Oman’s commercial importance and the need to control its ports, the Buyids adopted a hostile stance in their relations with the Omani sultans. Oman’s crucial role in East-West trade made it a regional commercial hub. Therefore, for the Buyid princes, who made great emphasis on commerce and trade, Oman was of high value. Medieval Islamic geographers clearly illustrate that contemporaneous with the Buyids in Iraq, the Persian Gulf’s commercial triangle consisted of Basrah, Siraf, and Oman, complementing each other in the movement of trading ships between East and West.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_78439_3b954ffff66ef68b090aa72bde2572f2.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622The Tendency toward Ritual Shiism among Anatolian Sufis and Its Role in Linking Sufism and ShiismThe Tendency toward Ritual Shiism among Anatolian Sufis and Its Role in Linking Sufism and Shiism1921697789510.22081/hiq.2021.58162.2066FAHadiAminianPhD Student, Department of History, Sha.C., Islamic Azad University, Shahrood, IranAhmadAshrafiDepartment of History, Sha.C., Islamic Azad University, Shahrood, IranMohamadSalimDepartment of History, Sha.C., Islamic Azad University, Shahrood, IranJournal Article20200706The aim of this study is to examine the process of Shiʿi-leaning among the Turkish-speaking nomadic tribes of Asia Minor, the interpretation of Shiism by Anatolian Sufi elites, and the spread of ritualized Shiism within Anatolian society between the 6th and 10th centuries A.H (12th–16th centuries CE). The research, conducted through the descriptive-analytical method common in the humanities and historical studies, seeks to explore the relationship between Sufi orientations and Shiʿi rituals and ceremonies, and the impact of this issue on the development of Shiʿi identity among the Anatolian Alawites—an issue that has received comparatively little attention in scholarship on the interplay between Shiism and Sufism. The findings indicate that several factors—including the influence of Iranian culture on Asia Minor, the concurrent development of ritual Shiism and Sufism in the 8th–9th/13th–14th centuries, and, in particular, the distinctive religious outlook and practices of the Turkish-speaking nomads—contributed to the emergence of a Sufi religiosity inclined toward certain Shiʿi rites. With the consolidation of tendency towards Islam, this form of religiousness became widespread among the inhabitants of Anatolia, especially after the Mongol invasions, and came to represent a dominant mode of piety for the segments of population. One of the main factors behind the expansion of non-jurisprudential Shiism in Anatolia was the proliferation of Sufi orders and the fusion of their teachings with the extremist Shiʿi doctrines. From the 6th century A.H onward, numerous eclectic Sufi paths emerged, shaped by the popular and rudimentary outlook of the Turkmen nomads and the absence of established Shi’i scholarly and cultural centers in Anatolia. These promoted a form of Islam adapted to the tribal communities’ inherited religious customs, one that stood in opposition to the normative Sunnī tradition as well as the scholarly, jurisprudential interpretation of Shiism. Regardless of the origin of the term “Alavi” for Anatolian Shiites, their religious identity during the medieval Islamic centuries was marked by the esoteric influences and Sufi-inspired teachings, which diverged from Jaʿfarī jurisprudence. Alavi religiousness centered on Imam ʿAlī (PBUH) and the image of him presented to the people of Asia Minor by Shiʿi-leaning Sufis. Following the Ottoman conquest of Anatolia, the severing of the Alawites’ scholarly ties with Shiʿi seminaries and jurisprudence centers deprived them of access to the intellectual and doctrinal heritage of the Ahl al-Bayt (PBUH). In conclusion, while Islam was formally introduced into Asia Minor through the political structures, the persistence of older cultural patterns and popular religious understandings led to a synthesis of semi-mystical perceptions and radicalized religious doctrines. The nomadic society of Anatolia, lacking the capacity to engage with jurisprudentially grounded religious instruction, under the guidance of Sufi sheikhs, embraced a ritualistic and accommodative form of Islam and Shiism. The community known today as the Alawites of Turkey—constituting the majority of Shiites in that country—are the heirs of this non-jurisprudential, Sufi-inflected expression of Shiism.The aim of this study is to examine the process of Shiʿi-leaning among the Turkish-speaking nomadic tribes of Asia Minor, the interpretation of Shiism by Anatolian Sufi elites, and the spread of ritualized Shiism within Anatolian society between the 6th and 10th centuries A.H (12th–16th centuries CE). The research, conducted through the descriptive-analytical method common in the humanities and historical studies, seeks to explore the relationship between Sufi orientations and Shiʿi rituals and ceremonies, and the impact of this issue on the development of Shiʿi identity among the Anatolian Alawites—an issue that has received comparatively little attention in scholarship on the interplay between Shiism and Sufism. The findings indicate that several factors—including the influence of Iranian culture on Asia Minor, the concurrent development of ritual Shiism and Sufism in the 8th–9th/13th–14th centuries, and, in particular, the distinctive religious outlook and practices of the Turkish-speaking nomads—contributed to the emergence of a Sufi religiosity inclined toward certain Shiʿi rites. With the consolidation of tendency towards Islam, this form of religiousness became widespread among the inhabitants of Anatolia, especially after the Mongol invasions, and came to represent a dominant mode of piety for the segments of population. One of the main factors behind the expansion of non-jurisprudential Shiism in Anatolia was the proliferation of Sufi orders and the fusion of their teachings with the extremist Shiʿi doctrines. From the 6th century A.H onward, numerous eclectic Sufi paths emerged, shaped by the popular and rudimentary outlook of the Turkmen nomads and the absence of established Shi’i scholarly and cultural centers in Anatolia. These promoted a form of Islam adapted to the tribal communities’ inherited religious customs, one that stood in opposition to the normative Sunnī tradition as well as the scholarly, jurisprudential interpretation of Shiism. Regardless of the origin of the term “Alavi” for Anatolian Shiites, their religious identity during the medieval Islamic centuries was marked by the esoteric influences and Sufi-inspired teachings, which diverged from Jaʿfarī jurisprudence. Alavi religiousness centered on Imam ʿAlī (PBUH) and the image of him presented to the people of Asia Minor by Shiʿi-leaning Sufis. Following the Ottoman conquest of Anatolia, the severing of the Alawites’ scholarly ties with Shiʿi seminaries and jurisprudence centers deprived them of access to the intellectual and doctrinal heritage of the Ahl al-Bayt (PBUH). In conclusion, while Islam was formally introduced into Asia Minor through the political structures, the persistence of older cultural patterns and popular religious understandings led to a synthesis of semi-mystical perceptions and radicalized religious doctrines. The nomadic society of Anatolia, lacking the capacity to engage with jurisprudentially grounded religious instruction, under the guidance of Sufi sheikhs, embraced a ritualistic and accommodative form of Islam and Shiism. The community known today as the Alawites of Turkey—constituting the majority of Shiites in that country—are the heirs of this non-jurisprudential, Sufi-inflected expression of Shiism.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_77895_a794bdb7c22908ba1ad19b97314dfa7f.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622The Role of Tabrizi Merchants in Reformist Activities and Modernization in Qajar EraThe Role of Tabrizi Merchants in Reformist Activities and Modernization in Qajar Era2181937844010.22081/hiq.2023.66818.2338FAFarahnazBahramporDepartment of History of Iran after Islam, Shab.C., Islamic Azad University, Shabestar, Iran.ManizhehSadriDepartment of History, Shab.C., Islamic Azad University, Shabestar, IranRahimShohratifarDepartment of History, Ab.C, Islamic Azad University, Abhar, Iran.Mohammad BagherAramDepartment of History, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran.Journal Article20230625During Qajar period, the city of Tabriz served as the gateway for the introduction of<br />the reformist ideas and the Western goods into Iran due to its strategic geographical location and proximity to the Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire. This issue turned Tabriz into one of the earliest centers of modernization and renewal in the country. Tabrizi merchants, who possessed wealth, international trade connections, and familiarity with Western developments, had a clear understanding of Iran’s economic backwardness and took effective measures to reform the country’s economic and industrial structures. This study, taking advantage of the descriptive-analytical method, investigates the role and activities of Tabrizi merchants in regard with the economic, commercial, and industrial modernization from Nasser al-Din Shah Era until the end of the Qajar dynasty, and addresses the question on what actions Tabrizi merchants took regarding the commercial and industrial modernization. Initially, the merchants contributed to the establishment of institutions such as the Merchants’ Representatives Assembly and later the Commercial Court (Dar al-Tijarah), aiming to create a guild-like structure to organize economic activities and protect merchants’ interests against the Western economic influence and internal despotism. These institutions represented early models of civil institution-building with an economic approach and eventually evolved into the chambers of commerce. Subsequently, these merchants founded commercial offices in domestic and international cities such as Istanbul, Cairo, Bombay, and Baku, forming an active network of trade relations and international information exchange. These offices facilitated the expansion of exports, controlled imports, technology exchange, and awareness of global market trends. Another significant initiative was the establishment of modern companies or corporations. Utilizing the joint-stock investment model and pooling financial resources, these companies operated in sectors like road construction, transportation, financial services, export, and small industries. The Etihad Company, Azerbaijan Company, and the Iran Public Company were among the notable institutions in which Tabrizi merchants played influential roles. In the sphere of industrial modernization, Tabrizi merchants established factories producing carpets, spun yarn, porcelain, matches, leather, soap, and printing presses, aiming to meet the domestic market demands and counteract the dominance of Western goods. Some factories were equipped with modern machinery and even involved foreign engineers. Prominent examples include Momtaz Match Factory, Ali Monsieur’s Porcelain Factory, Baba Mohammadov Ganja’s Carpet weaving Workshop, and Mashhad Electricity factory. Moreover, Tabrizi merchants played a vital role in infrastructure development, including the establishment of telephone exchanges, power plants, the<br />import of steam machineries, and proposition of road construction projects. These<br />efforts reflect their awareness of the linkage between infrastructure, commerce, and industrial development. Although Qajar government had a limited role in guiding these transformations due to the weak economic planning, the private sector, particularly Tabrizi merchants, leveraged their capital, experience, and trade networks to offer a successful model of indigenous modernization. Besides the economic profit, their motivations included nationalist sentiments, concerns about the foreign economic domination, and desire for the national economic independence. In summary, Tabrizi merchants’ role went beyond mere trading and they laid some of the foundational pillars of Iran’s economic modernization as modernist entrepreneurs. Their activities in establishing the commercial and industrial institutions paved the way for more significant changes during the Constitutional Revolution and afterward.During Qajar period, the city of Tabriz served as the gateway for the introduction of<br />the reformist ideas and the Western goods into Iran due to its strategic geographical location and proximity to the Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire. This issue turned Tabriz into one of the earliest centers of modernization and renewal in the country. Tabrizi merchants, who possessed wealth, international trade connections, and familiarity with Western developments, had a clear understanding of Iran’s economic backwardness and took effective measures to reform the country’s economic and industrial structures. This study, taking advantage of the descriptive-analytical method, investigates the role and activities of Tabrizi merchants in regard with the economic, commercial, and industrial modernization from Nasser al-Din Shah Era until the end of the Qajar dynasty, and addresses the question on what actions Tabrizi merchants took regarding the commercial and industrial modernization. Initially, the merchants contributed to the establishment of institutions such as the Merchants’ Representatives Assembly and later the Commercial Court (Dar al-Tijarah), aiming to create a guild-like structure to organize economic activities and protect merchants’ interests against the Western economic influence and internal despotism. These institutions represented early models of civil institution-building with an economic approach and eventually evolved into the chambers of commerce. Subsequently, these merchants founded commercial offices in domestic and international cities such as Istanbul, Cairo, Bombay, and Baku, forming an active network of trade relations and international information exchange. These offices facilitated the expansion of exports, controlled imports, technology exchange, and awareness of global market trends. Another significant initiative was the establishment of modern companies or corporations. Utilizing the joint-stock investment model and pooling financial resources, these companies operated in sectors like road construction, transportation, financial services, export, and small industries. The Etihad Company, Azerbaijan Company, and the Iran Public Company were among the notable institutions in which Tabrizi merchants played influential roles. In the sphere of industrial modernization, Tabrizi merchants established factories producing carpets, spun yarn, porcelain, matches, leather, soap, and printing presses, aiming to meet the domestic market demands and counteract the dominance of Western goods. Some factories were equipped with modern machinery and even involved foreign engineers. Prominent examples include Momtaz Match Factory, Ali Monsieur’s Porcelain Factory, Baba Mohammadov Ganja’s Carpet weaving Workshop, and Mashhad Electricity factory. Moreover, Tabrizi merchants played a vital role in infrastructure development, including the establishment of telephone exchanges, power plants, the<br />import of steam machineries, and proposition of road construction projects. These<br />efforts reflect their awareness of the linkage between infrastructure, commerce, and industrial development. Although Qajar government had a limited role in guiding these transformations due to the weak economic planning, the private sector, particularly Tabrizi merchants, leveraged their capital, experience, and trade networks to offer a successful model of indigenous modernization. Besides the economic profit, their motivations included nationalist sentiments, concerns about the foreign economic domination, and desire for the national economic independence. In summary, Tabrizi merchants’ role went beyond mere trading and they laid some of the foundational pillars of Iran’s economic modernization as modernist entrepreneurs. Their activities in establishing the commercial and industrial institutions paved the way for more significant changes during the Constitutional Revolution and afterward.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_78440_01905fb974247a5a52e29ab4e78de8b1.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityHistory of Islam2008-643126220250622Services of Abolfazl Towliyat (1300–1358)
Based on Oral InformationServices of Abolfazl Towliyat (1300–1358)
Based on Oral Information2432197844310.22081/hiq.2022.63620.2249FAZahraJiravandPhD., Department of History of Twelver Shiism, University of Religions and Beliefs, Qom, IranMansourDadashnejadAssociate Professor, Department of History, Research Institute of Seminary and University, Qom, IranAhmedJamrasiPhD., Department of History of Iran, Center for Documents of the Holy Shrine of Hazrat Masoumeh (PBUH), Qom, IranJournal Article20220315This study aims to examine the life and character of Abolfazl Towliyat, one of the prominent figures of the Holy Shrine of Hazrat Masoumeh (PBUH) in Qom. Having served for many years as the chief custodian of the shrine, he is regarded as an outstanding personality in the contemporary history of Qom, whose ethical conduct, management style, and manner of interaction with pilgrims, staff, and religious scholars were admired and praised by his contemporaries and associates. Accordingly, this research revisits his individual and social persona through the oral memories from close relatives, colleagues, and cultural figures of Qom, particularly in light of the absence of any systematic or analytical written work on him, with his name appearing only sporadically in some memoirs and quotations. Emphasizing the significance of the chief custodianship within the shrine’s administrative structure and its relation to the social developments of Qom in the 20th century, the study highlights the necessity of focusing on the role of figures like Abolfazl Towliyat. Through the collection and analysis of dispersed narratives about<br />his life and lifestyle, based on interviews with his family, friends, and colleagues, a documented and comprehensive portrayal is presented. Towliyat was a refined, well-dressed, courteous, dignified, sincere, and pious individual whose conduct toward servants, students, and even the general public was characterized by politeness, humility, and fairness. Despite holding a significant position in the shrine, he never resorted to power displays or abuse of authority. According to reports from shrine staff and some students, socially he was organized, serious, committed, and responsible. Although Towliyat was not from the clerical class, he maintained respectful relations with the religious scholars and prominent figures of the seminary, with deep and meaningful connections to some, such as Ayatollah Mar’ashi Najafi and Ayatollah Golpayegani. Notably, he avoided ostentation, flattery, and involvement in political circles, traits that made him a trusted and reassuring figure among the shrine employees and some religious scholars. Based on the conducted interviews, he possessed a strong memory for Persian poetry, especially the sonnets of Hafez, and recited texts and poems with taste and precision. This, coupled with his warm and polite demeanor, fostered closeness and popularity among the shrine staff. From a managerial perspective, Towliyat was disciplined and accountable in fulfilling his duties. He approached responsibilities meticulously and supervised the shrine’s environment, staff behavior, and the respect afforded to pilgrims with sensitivity. Simultaneously, he acted calmly, impartially, and wisely in cases of conflict or disorder, striving to keep the sacred place free from tension. He recognized the sanctity of the shrine and contributed through his actions to its preservation. Abolfazl Towliyat represents a model of non-clerical religious managers in Iran’s contemporary religious institutions who, through commitment, ethics, and responsibility, left an enduring legacy in the collective memory of their religious community. He passed away in 1979 (1358 A.H) and remained respected by many scholars, literati, and shrine personnel during his life and after his death.This study aims to examine the life and character of Abolfazl Towliyat, one of the prominent figures of the Holy Shrine of Hazrat Masoumeh (PBUH) in Qom. Having served for many years as the chief custodian of the shrine, he is regarded as an outstanding personality in the contemporary history of Qom, whose ethical conduct, management style, and manner of interaction with pilgrims, staff, and religious scholars were admired and praised by his contemporaries and associates. Accordingly, this research revisits his individual and social persona through the oral memories from close relatives, colleagues, and cultural figures of Qom, particularly in light of the absence of any systematic or analytical written work on him, with his name appearing only sporadically in some memoirs and quotations. Emphasizing the significance of the chief custodianship within the shrine’s administrative structure and its relation to the social developments of Qom in the 20th century, the study highlights the necessity of focusing on the role of figures like Abolfazl Towliyat. Through the collection and analysis of dispersed narratives about<br />his life and lifestyle, based on interviews with his family, friends, and colleagues, a documented and comprehensive portrayal is presented. Towliyat was a refined, well-dressed, courteous, dignified, sincere, and pious individual whose conduct toward servants, students, and even the general public was characterized by politeness, humility, and fairness. Despite holding a significant position in the shrine, he never resorted to power displays or abuse of authority. According to reports from shrine staff and some students, socially he was organized, serious, committed, and responsible. Although Towliyat was not from the clerical class, he maintained respectful relations with the religious scholars and prominent figures of the seminary, with deep and meaningful connections to some, such as Ayatollah Mar’ashi Najafi and Ayatollah Golpayegani. Notably, he avoided ostentation, flattery, and involvement in political circles, traits that made him a trusted and reassuring figure among the shrine employees and some religious scholars. Based on the conducted interviews, he possessed a strong memory for Persian poetry, especially the sonnets of Hafez, and recited texts and poems with taste and precision. This, coupled with his warm and polite demeanor, fostered closeness and popularity among the shrine staff. From a managerial perspective, Towliyat was disciplined and accountable in fulfilling his duties. He approached responsibilities meticulously and supervised the shrine’s environment, staff behavior, and the respect afforded to pilgrims with sensitivity. Simultaneously, he acted calmly, impartially, and wisely in cases of conflict or disorder, striving to keep the sacred place free from tension. He recognized the sanctity of the shrine and contributed through his actions to its preservation. Abolfazl Towliyat represents a model of non-clerical religious managers in Iran’s contemporary religious institutions who, through commitment, ethics, and responsibility, left an enduring legacy in the collective memory of their religious community. He passed away in 1979 (1358 A.H) and remained respected by many scholars, literati, and shrine personnel during his life and after his death.https://hiq.bou.ac.ir/article_78443_496c41c23186c4d086adbfef37445ab5.pdf